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INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 
Lucian E. Dervan* 
ABSTRACT 
Much has been written about the methods by which counsel may 
efficiently, thoroughly, and credibly conduct internal investigations.1  
Given the globalization of such matters, however, this Article seeks to 
focus on the challenges present when conducting an internal investi-
gation of potential international white-collar criminal activity.  In Part 
I, this Article will examine the challenges of selecting counsel to per-
form internal investigations abroad.  In particular, consideration will 
be given to global standards regarding the application of the attorney-
client privilege and work product protections.  In Part II, this Article 
will discuss the influence of data privacy and protection laws in vari-
ous countries and analyze the challenges of attempting to conduct an 
American-style internal investigation in such jurisdictions.  Part III of 
this Article will examine interactions with employees during interna-
tional internal investigations and will consider the challenges of com-
plying with varying labor laws and due process requirements around 
the world.  Finally, in Part IV, this Article will discuss the hazards of 
multi-jurisdictional investigations by government agencies.  In partic-
ular, consideration will be given to decisions regarding the disclosure 
of investigatory findings and the difficulties of engaging in settlement 
negotiations in an international enforcement environment. 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law, and former 
member of the King & Spalding LLP Special Matters and Government Investigations 
Team.  Special thanks to my research assistant, Brian Lee, for his work on this pro-
ject, along with the research assistance of Allison Balch, Katie Oehmke, Angela Rol-
lins, and Neil Schonert.   
 1. See generally Lucian E. Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Miscon-
duct in the Age of the Whistleblower: Foreseeing and Avoiding Hidden Dangers, 3 
BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 670 (2008) [hereinafter Dervan, Responding to Potential 
Employee Misconduct]; Paul B. Murphy &  Lucian E. Dervan, Watching Your Step: 
Avoiding the Pitfalls and Perils When Conducting Internal Investigations, 16 ALAS 
LOSS PREVENTION J. 2 (2005) [hereinafter Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 14, 2010, Russian authorities raided Hewlett-Packard’s 
(HP’s) Moscow company offices in search of information regarding 
an alleged scheme by employees in Germany to bribe Russian offi-
cials.2  HP’s German subsidiary allegedly paid kickbacks in Russia to 
obtain a €35 million contract for the delivery and installation of an in-
formation technology network to a Russian public prosecutor’s of-
fice.3  By September 2010, HP publicly disclosed through its securities 
filings that the criminal investigations into the scheme had spread well 
beyond Germany and Russia and now included an investigation by 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).4  Further, HP revealed that the investigation by 
 
 2. See Bruce Zagaris, Bribery Investigation of Hewlett-Packard Spread, 26 INT’L 
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 445, 445 (2010) [hereinafter Zagaris, Bribery Investigation] 
(“Russian authorities conducted the searches at the request of German authorities, 
investigating $7 million in suspicious payments to Russian officials.”); see also Bruce 
E. Yannet & David M. Fuhr, Russia: H-P Bribery Investigation and Public and Pri-
vate Anti-Corruption Efforts, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP FCPA UPDATE 9, at 3 
(2010) (citations omitted) (“The investigation reportedly began in 2007 after a Ger-
man tax auditor became suspicious of payments a Germany H-P subsidiary made to-
taling €22 million to a small computer hardware firm near Leipzig from 2004 to 2006.  
The H-P subsidiary recorded the payments as having been made for services ren-
dered in Moscow.  The investigation also identified three payment intermediaries, 
shell companies in multiple jurisdictions, and a Moscow-based computer supplier 
with foreign bank accounts as having conspired with H-P to perpetrate the alleged 
bribery scheme.  Using H-P funds, the intermediaries—based in former East Germa-
ny—allegedly paid fake invoices to the shell companies for equipment.  The illicit 
funds then flowed through bank accounts all over the world—including the U.K., the 
U.S., New Zealand, the British Virgin Islands, Latvia, Lithuania, Belize, Austria, and 
Switzerland—before making their way to Russia.”).  
 3. See Zagaris, Bribery Investigation, supra note 2, at 445.  
 4. See Joseph Palazzolo, H-P Bribe Probe Widens, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704644404575481961121687910.html. 
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the United States’ government had expanded to include Germany, 
Russia, Austria, Serbia, and the Netherlands.5  The proliferation of an 
alleged bribe in Germany into subsequent government investigations 
in as many as twelve countries around the globe demonstrates the tru-
ly international nature of white collar crime in the twenty-first centu-
ry.6  With this internationalization of white collar crime and increase 
in global enforcement initiatives and cooperatives comes an inevita-
ble byproduct: the globalization of internal corporate investigations.7 
The historical rise of internal investigations as an important tool in 
the arsenals of corporate defense counsel can be traced to increasing-
ly aggressive enforcement programs by the SEC in the 1960s.8  During 
this period, the SEC staff was tasked with creating innovative en-
forcement mechanisms by which corporations would be required to 
 
 5. See Brandon Bailey, HP Corruption Case Expands to Other European Coun-
tries, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010) (“HP also said in its report that U.S. 
authorities have sought information relating to whether HP personnel in Russia, 
Germany, Austria, Serbia and the Netherlands ‘were involved in kickbacks or other 
improper payments’ to distributors, government agencies or private parties.”). 
 6. See Michael D. Hausfeld, Global Enforcement of Anticompetitive Conduct, 
10 SEDONA CONF. J. 9, 9 (2009) (“Globalization of commerce has increased the eco-
nomic interdependence of countries around the world.  The increasing integration of 
markets has brought with it an increase in the number and frequency of anti-
competitive business practices, affecting economies worldwide.”); Bruce Zagaris, In-
ternational Enforcement Law Trends for 2010 and Beyond: Can the Cops Keep Up 
with the Criminals?, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) [hereinafter 
Zagaris, International Enforcement] (“The modern economy, globalization, and new 
technologies facilitate the spread of transnational crime, especially economic 
crime.”). 
 7. See Tommy Helsby, Compliance: Why ‘by the Book’ is Good for the Books, 
CORP. GOV. ASIA, Apr.–June 2011, at 30, available at http://www.krollconsulting.com 
/media/pdfs/Corporate_Gov_Asia_Tommy_Helsby_July_2011_jpg.pdf (“The past 
twelve months have brought not only tougher regulation, including the Dodd-Frank 
Act in the United States and the Bribery Act in the United Kingdom, but also more 
active enforcement—notably increased resources devoted to corruption investiga-
tions in the United States at the Department of Justice and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission as well as a similar business crime focus in Britain at the Serious 
Fraud Office.  Meanwhile, storied magistrates elsewhere in Europe—Joly in France, 
Garzon in Spain, DiPietro in Italy—have been succeeded by a new generation of of-
ficials keen to make their names.  Prosecutors in Germany, often in cooperation with 
their counterparts in the United States and elsewhere, have successfully targeted a 
series of major domestic businesses.”); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and 
the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 325, 325–26 
(1997) (discussing the increase and anticipated increase in enforcement regarding in-
ternational activities).  
 8. See Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 
655, 656 (1984) (“I first began to observe the development of corporate self-
investigations as an outgrowth of the increased pace of the SEC’s nationwide en-
forcement program in the early 1960s.”).  
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engage in activities to restore the corporation to a “pre-violation, law-
abiding condition.”9  One example of such ancillary relief was the re-
quirement that a receiver be appointed to ensure corporate impropri-
eties were halted.10  Over time, however, corporations began to pro-
pose an alternative to receivership, which was a costly and intrusive 
form of government oversight.11  Instead, corporations began propos-
ing that injunctive relief orders contain a requirement that the corpo-
ration undertake an internal investigation on its own using special 
counsel to achieve the same ends.12  By the early 1970s, the ordering 
of internal investigations led by the corporation, rather than the SEC, 
had become the norm, with one court commenting that the appoint-
ment of special counsel to conduct an internal investigation as part of 
an SEC settlement was “a ‘desirable and economical practice’ that ‘al-
lows the company to keep its own house clean and avoid unnecessary 
governmental supervision.’”13 
 
 9. See id. at 656–57 (“[T]he Enforcement staff [in the 1960s] was encouraged to 
seek sometimes novel, somewhat exotic additional relief in important civil injunctive 
actions.  Such ancillary relief, as it came to be called, was designed to make victims 
whole and to restore corporate circumstances to healthier, pre-violation, law-abiding 
conditions: it was an important supplement to the traditional injunctive order, which 
merely deterred future violations.  The decade of the 1960s saw SEC civil injunctive 
enforcement actions request with increasing regularity such ancillary relief.  The SEC 
sought ancillary relief in such forms as appointment of receivers or special agents, 
restitution or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, limitations on activities of officers or 
directors, wholesale restructuring of boards or directors, accountings, and restrictions 
on voting blocs of stock and rescission offers.”). 
 10. See id. at 657 (“For example . . . the SEC sought, in addition to injunctive re-
lief, restitution of over $1.2 million from the principal officers and directors of the 
corporate defendant, as well as appointment of a receiver to assure that corporate 
affairs would be conducted properly, that all self-dealing would be halted, and that 
the company’s deficient SEC filings would be corrected.”). 
 11. See id. (“Astute defense counsel, wiser and more experienced than I, were 
willing to counsel their clients to provide the requested restitution after an appropri-
ate accounting, but refused to consider appointment of a receiver. . . .  [C]ounsel 
countered the SEC’s request for a receiver with an offer to have the district court ap-
point three new independent directors to constitute a court-supervised majority on 
the five-person board . . . and to charge the independent directors to pursue an inter-
nal corporate investigation.”). 
 12. See id. at 658 (“Thus, by the early 1970s, the SEC was gradually learning that 
an efficacious way to straighten out huge corporate messes brought to surface by 
some of its major enforcement actions was to restructure boards of directors and 
cause independent directors or their special counsel to accomplish internal corporate 
self-investigations, rather than to tie up scarce government resources to do the whole 
job in each case.”). 
 13. Id. at 661 (quoting United States v. Handler, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,519, at 94,024 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1978)); see  Mathews, supra note 
8, at 661–62 (“It gradually became rather routine to settle an SEC enforcement case 
against a major corporation by agreeing to have outside counsel serve as special 
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In 1977, in the wake of the Watergate scandal and revelations that 
hundreds of American corporations were bribing foreign governmen-
tal officials, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was passed in-
to law.14  The statute, which remains a centerpiece of international 
white collar criminal enforcement today, prohibits  
corruptly paying or promising to pay money or anything of value to 
a foreign official, foreign political party, foreign political party offi-
cial, or candidate for foreign political office to influence the foreign 
official in the exercise of his or her official duties to assist the payor 
in obtaining or retaining business.15   
Given the sensitive nature and significant business and reputational 
risks associated with criminal charges stemming from this type of 
conduct, American corporations began to realize the value of con-
ducting internal investigations before the government became in-
volved in the matter, rather than merely utilizing this tool to settle ex-
isting enforcement actions.16 As a result, corporations and their 
counsel began to ask why it would not be more prudent for a compa-
ny to investigate itself privately without court supervision, SEC moni-
toring, or inflexible conditions imposed by a consent decree.  By em-
ploying a self-investigation procedure, a company could use inside or 
 
counsel in conducting an internal corporate investigation on behalf of the company’s 
board of directors or audit committee.”); see also David S. Hilzenrath, U.S. Investiga-
tions of Firms Rely on Companies’ Own Legal Work, WASH. POST (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/justice-department-sec-
investigations-often-rely-on-companies-internal-
probes/2011/04/26/AFO2HP9G_story.html (“As the U.S. government steps up inves-
tigations of companies suspected of paying bribes overseas, law enforcement officials 
are leaving much of the detective work to the very corporations under suspicion.  The 
probes are so costly and wide-ranging that the Justice Department and Securities and 
Exchange Commission often let the companies investigate themselves.”).  
Hilzenrath’s article further notes that Avon has confirmed spending more than $130 
million on internal investigations in recent years, and Siemens has spent about $950 
million on recent global bribery inquiries. Id.  
 14. See F. Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer & Michael S. Diamant, The British are 
Coming!: Britain Changes Its Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International 
Fight Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2010).  
 15. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006); see Warin 
et al., supra note 14, at 8–9 (“The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions cast a wide net.  
They can ensnare corporations and individuals, including any officer, director, em-
ployee, or agent of a corporation and any stockholder acting on behalf of a subject 
entity.”). 
 16. See Mathews, supra note 8, at 666 (“As the sensitive foreign payments cases 
mushroomed in the mid-1970s, the corporate defense bar awoke to the fact that 
proper corporate maneuvering in advance of, or in the midst of, an SEC enforcement 
investigation might lead to a less painful resolution of corporate payments.”).   
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outside counsel, not necessarily wholly independent, and at least not 
subject to prior approval of the SEC or the court.17 
With the realization in the 1970s of the significant advantages of 
acting in advance of government inquiries, the modern internal cor-
porate investigation was born.18 
Much has been written about the methods by which counsel may 
efficiently, thoroughly, and credibly conduct internal investigations.19  
Given the globalization of such matters, however, this Article seeks to 
focus on the challenges present when conducting an internal investi-
gation of potential international white collar criminal activity.  In Part 
I, this Article will examine the challenges of selecting counsel to per-
form internal investigations abroad.  In particular, consideration will 
be given to global standards regarding the application of the attorney-
client privilege and work product protections.  In Part II, this Article 
will discuss the influence of data privacy and protection laws in vari-
ous countries and analyze the challenges of attempting to conduct an 
American-style internal investigation in such jurisdictions.  Part III of 
this Article will examine interactions with employees during interna-
tional internal investigations and consider the challenges of comply-
ing with varying labor laws and due process requirements around the 
world.  Finally, in Section IV, this Article will discuss the hazards of 
multi-jurisdictional investigations by government agencies.  In partic-
ular, consideration will be given to decisions regarding the disclosure 
of investigatory findings and the difficulties of engaging in settlement 
negotiations in an international enforcement environment. 
 
 17. Id.  
 18. See Sarah H. Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Profes-
sionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 869–71 (2003) 
(discussing the government’s increased focus on corporate crime beginning in the 
1960s and the resulting increase in internal investigations by corporations seeking to 
“identify and address issues before they became the focus of government inquiries.”); 
Kevin H. Michels, Internal Corporate Investigations and the Truth, 40 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 83, 84 (2010) (“In 2008, nearly half of all United States public companies 
commissioned outside counsel to conduct at least one internal investigation.”); Rich-
ard H. Porter, Voluntary Disclosures to Federal Agencies—Their Impact on the 
Ability of Corporations to Protect from Discovery Materials Developed During the 
Course of Internal Investigations, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (1990) (“In many 
American corporations, internal investigations are becoming commonplace.”).    
 19. See generally Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra 
note 1; Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, supra note 1. 
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I.  SELECTING THE INVESTIGATORS IN INTERNATIONAL MATTERS 
One of the most important initial considerations when launching an 
internal investigation is determining who will conduct the inquiry.20  
Several options exist, including utilizing corporate human resources, 
internal compliance officers, in-house counsel, or outside counsel.21  
In the context of potential international white collar criminal activity, 
however, it is clear that independent counsel should be retained as 
soon as possible to achieve two important goals.22  First, retention of 
outside counsel makes investigative findings more credible, because 
the government often looks with suspicion upon the statements and 
conclusions of insiders who may either be involved in the underlying 
misconduct or, at a minimum, who have a significant financial stake in 
the investigation’s outcome.23  Second, utilization of attorneys to con-
duct the investigation, rather than corporate employees or officers, 
shields investigative memoranda, reports, and conclusions from in-
voluntary disclosure to third parties, including the government, be-
cause of the application of the attorney-client privilege and work 
 
 20. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 
676 (“The first question that must be answered after an employee reports potential 
misconduct is who will perform the internal investigation.”).  While there are a myri-
ad of challenges that arise during international internal investigations, this Article 
will only focus on a select few issues that arise commonly during these inquiries.  
Counsel should be aware, however, that many other unique challenges can arise from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the international arena.  As such, counsel must be proac-
tive in ensuring an awareness of such issues.  One mechanism by which to better un-
derstand the unique legal requirements in each jurisdiction is to ensure local counsel 
is available for consultation.  
 21. Id. (“Where the issue does not implicate any potential wrongdoing on the part 
of the corporation or any of its employees and the issues are not prohibitively com-
plex, the investigation may be handled internally.”).   
 22. Id. (“However, once it becomes clear that there may be potential corporate 
liability or the issues become sufficiently complex, involvement by outside counsel is 
likely warranted.”). 
 23. See Robert S. Bennett, Alan Kriegel, Carl S. Rauth & Charles F. Walker, In-
ternal Investigations and the Defense of Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 
BUS. LAW. 55, 62 (2006) (“Although the perception may be unfair, in-house counsel 
are likely to be viewed by the government as lacking independence due to their status 
as part of the corporate management structure.  This can be a particular problem 
where the government perceives a conflict between the interests of a company’s 
management and the interests of its employees.”); J. Justin Johnston, Corporate In-
vestigations After the Mortgage Meltdown, 65 J. MO. B. 70, 73 (2009) (“[I]n fraud 
cases particularly, an internal investigation may require scrutiny of high-level corpo-
rate officers and others with power to affect in-house counsel’s future with the com-
pany.  Under no circumstances should in-house counsel be asked to investigate such 
persons due to the inherent lack of credibility regarding his or her conclusions.”). 
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product protections.24  While it appears at first glance that the issue of 
who will conduct the investigation is a simple one in the context of in-
ternational white collar crime, the reality of international multi-
jurisdictional inquiries makes this a complex and precarious area in 
which several potential pitfalls exist.25 
 
 24. See Bennett et al., supra note 23, at 63 (discussing the importance of establish-
ing attorney-client privilege during an internal investigation); Johnston, supra note 
23, at 73 (“Clearly, an investigation can be handled by non-attorney corporate em-
ployees, such as company security, or corporate officers.  The drawback to this meth-
od is that attorney-client privilege and work product protections do not attach to the 
result of the investigation.”); Porter, supra note 18, at 1009–10 (“Furthermore, there 
is a compelling practical reason why the investigation should not be conducted by 
management personnel: It is highly unlikely that documents generated during an in-
vestigation conducted by managerial personnel can be shielded from discovery by 
third parties.”). See generally Thomas R. Mulroy & Eric J. Munoz, The Internal Cor-
porate Investigation, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 49 (2002) (discussing the im-
portance of attorney-client privilege and work product protection in the internal in-
vestigation context).   
Interestingly, the application of attorney-client privilege and work product protection 
to internal investigations in the United States was not always assured.  In the mid-
1970s, a company called Diversified Industries undertook an internal corporate inves-
tigation regarding allegations of commercial bribery. See Diversified Industries, Inc. 
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1977); Mathews, supra note 8, at 669. The re-
port produced by counsel conducting the internal investigation was provided to the 
SEC and proved extremely helpful in negotiating a favorable resolution of the mat-
ter. Id. Later, however, private litigators sought copies of the internal investigation 
report for use in their civil suits. Id. The issue went to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, where a panel ruled that the material was not protected:  
[With regard to the investigatory report], [w]e have concluded . . . that the 
report is not entitled to protection on the basis of either attorney-client priv-
ilege or work product immunity. We find it unnecessary to decide whether 
the persons interviewed by the Firm’s representatives should be considered 
as “clients” because we are persuaded that Law Firm was not hired by Di-
versified to provide legal services or advice.  It was employed solely for the 
purpose of making an investigation of facts and to make business recom-
mendations with respect to the future conduct of Diversified in such areas 
as the results of the investigation might suggest.  
Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 603.  Fortunately for the future of such internal in-
vestigations, the Eighth Circuit en banc reversed the decision of the appellate panel:   
To be sure, there are possibilities of abuse, but the application of the attor-
ney-client privilege to this matter and others like it will encourage corpora-
tions to seek out and correct wrongdoing in their own house and to do so 
with attorneys who are obligated by the Code of Professional Responsibility 
to conduct the inquiry in an independent and ethical manner. . . .  We con-
clude that these employee interviews are confidential communications of 
the corporate client and entitled to the attorney-client privilege.  
Id. at 610–11; see also United States v. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. 383, 396–97 (1981) (es-
tablishing the modern standard by which privilege applies to internal corporate inves-
tigations). 
 25. See Walfrido J. Martinez, Recent Trends in and Practical Guidance for Pre-
venting and Defending International White Collar Crime, in INTERNATIONAL WHITE 
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 On February 10, 2003, the European Union’s (EU) Commis-
sion, charged with developing antitrust rules for the EU and investi-
gating alleged violations of EU competition provisions, ordered Akzo 
Nobel Chemicals Ltd. (Akzo) and Akcros Chemicals Ltd. (Akcros) to 
submit to an inquiry regarding potential anti-competitive practices.26  
On February 12 and 13, 2003, the Commission carried out a dawn raid 
on the companies’ Manchester, Britain, offices in search of docu-
ments relevant to the governmental investigation.27  During the 
search, Commission officials discovered two emails that appeared to 
contain relevant information.28  The emails were an exchange regard-
ing antitrust issues between a general manager and Akzo’s in-house 
counsel, who was in charge of coordinating competition law and who 
was a licensed practitioner in the Netherlands.29  Though company of-
ficials protested, the Commission’s representatives took the emails af-
ter concluding that the documents were not protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.30 
The basis for the Commission representatives’ decision to seize the 
documents was a 1982 European Court of Justice decision entitled 
AM&S v. Commission.31  In AM&S, the Commission sought docu-
 
COLLAR ENFORCEMENT: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS, COMPLYING WITH FCPA INVESTIGATIONS, AND ESTABLISHING EF-
FECTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, 2011 EDITION 81, 93 (Michaela Falls 
ed., 2010) [hereinafter INT’L WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT 2011 ED.], available at 
2010 WL 5312203, at *6 (“Attorneys representing clients in the international context 
must immediately familiarize themselves with the rules concerning privilege in order 
to minimize the risk of having ‘privileged’ information disclosed to third parties.”).  
 26. See Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. European Comm’n, 5 
C.M.L.R. 19, 1191 (2010).  
 27. See id.; Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., European Rejection of Attorney-Client 
Privilege for Inside Lawyers, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Oct. 2, 2010), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/10/02/european-
rejection-of-attorney-client-privilege-for-inside-lawyers. 
 28. See Heineman, Jr., supra note 27. 
 29. See Heineman, Jr., supra note 27 (“At issue were two emails about antitrust 
issues—obtained in a dawn raid aimed at enforcing EU competition laws—
exchanged between a general manager and an in-house lawyer who was a member of 
the Netherlands bar.”); see also Laurel S. Terry, Introductory Note to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union: The Akzo Nobel EU Attorney-Client Privilege Case, 
50 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 2 (2011) (noting that under the laws of the Nether-
lands, communications by this in-house counsel with his client, the corporation, were 
protected by the attorney-client privilege).  
 30. See Akzo Nobel Chems., 5 C.M.L.R. at 1191 (“After examining the last three 
documents and obtaining the applicants’ observations, the head of the investigating 
team took the view that they were definitely not privileged.”).  
 31. See Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1982 
E.C.R. 1575; see also Maurits Dolmans, Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House 
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ments regarding potential price-fixing from AM&S’s Bristol, Eng-
land, offices that the company claimed were protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.32  In considering the application of privilege to 
the documents, the court held that an EU rule of privilege, rather 
than a country specific rule, applied in all Commission investigations 
of anti-competitive practices.33  To fall within the protection of the 
EU rule of privilege, two elements were required to be satisfied.34  
“First, the communication must have been given for purposes of the 
client’s defense.  Second, the communication must have been with an 
independent lawyer, which would not include in-house counsel.”35  As 
the emails seized in the Akzo Nobel case involved communications 
between an in-house attorney and a company manager, the Commis-
sion believed they were not protected from disclosure, even though 
privilege rules in the Netherlands would have protected the ex-
change.36 
The dispute over the documents taken from the Manchester offices 
continued with the companies sending a letter of complaint to the 
Commission in mid-February 2003.37  On May 8, 2003, however, the 
Commission rejected the application of privilege and the request for 
the return of the emails.38  Later that year, the companies filed an ac-
tion with the EU’s General Court, and the matter eventually made its 
 
Counsel: A European Proposal, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 125, 125 (1998) (discussing the 
state of privilege in Europe); Terry, supra note 29, at 1. 
 32. See Dan R. Mastromarco, Disparity in the Application of Legal Principles as 
a Form of Trade Restraint: Attorney-Client Privilege in the European Community, 
13 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 479, 482 (1990); see also Theofanis Christoforou, 
Protection of Legal Privilege in EEC Competition Law: The Imperfections of a Case, 
9 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (1985).  
 33. See Terry, supra note 29, at 1.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1–2; see also Stephen A. Calhoun, Globalization’s Erosion of the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege and What U.S. Courts Can Do to Prevent It, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
235, 240 (2008) (“First, the communications must be ‘made for the purposes and in 
the interests of the client’s right of defence.’ Second, the communications must ‘ema-
nate from independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not bound to the client 
by a relationship of employment.’”).  
 36. Terry, supra note 29, at 2 n.10 (“The contract between Akzo and its in-house 
counsel specifically acknowledged the in-house counsel’s freedom and independence.  
Under Dutch law, this agreement and the lawyer’s status as a member of the bar 
meant that Dutch [privilege laws] applied.”).  
 37. See Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. European Comm’n, 5 
C.M.L.R. 19, 1191 (2010). 
 38. See id. at 1192. 
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way back to the European Court of Justice almost twenty years after 
the AM&S case.39 
In its Akzo Nobel decision rejecting the companies’ claims of privi-
lege, the European Court of Justice reaffirmed its earlier, narrow in-
terpretation of the applicability of privilege in the corporate context.40  
In particular, the court stated, “It follows, both from the in-house 
lawyer’s economic dependence and the close ties with his employer, 
that he does not enjoy a level of professional independence compara-
ble to that of an external lawyer,” resulting in a failure to satisfy the 
second prong of the AM&S test.41  Importantly, however, the court 
noted that the EU privilege standard established in AM&S and reit-
erated in Akzo Nobel applies only to EU investigations, such as those 
conducted by the Commission regarding anti-competitive practices.42  
As such, in other legal situations the various laws of each individual 
country of the EU apply, some of which take similar views of in-
house counsel.43 
 
 39. See id.  
 40. See id. at 1201; see also John Gergacz, Privileged Communications with In-
House Counsel Under United States and European Community Law: A Proposed 
Re-Evaluation of the Akzo Nobel Decision, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323, 323 (2009) 
(“In Akzo Nobel, the court held that lawyers employed as in-house counsel were not 
independent of their corporate employers and, thus, could not engage in privileged 
communications with their client, the corporation.”); Mauro Squitieri, The Use of In-
formation in EU Competition Proceedings and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
42 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 449, 461–64 (2011) (discussing the Akzo decision).  
 41. Akzo Nobel Chems., 5 C.M.L.R. at 1198. (“Therefore, the General Court cor-
rectly applied the second condition from legal professional privilege laid down in the 
judgment in Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities.”).  
 42. See Terry, supra note 29, at 3 (“As [commentators] have correctly observed, 
Akzo Nobel does not invalidate or change the legal professional privilege that applies 
to Member State proceedings . . . . Moreover, AM&S and Akzo Nobel were limited 
to the Commission’s competition investigations, not competition proceedings by 
Member States.”).  
 43. See id. at 1 (“In addition to its rules about bar eligibility, each EU Member 
State has its own set of rules or case-law governing the confidentiality or privileged 
nature of communications between clients and their lawyers.  These national laws 
vary in some significant respects.  For example, in some EU Member States, the 
privilege belongs to the client, whereas in other Member States, the privilege belongs 
to the lawyer.  In some EU Member States, confidentiality can be waived, whereas in 
other Member States, this is not possible.”); see also Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Interna-
tional HR Best Practice Tips: Conducting Internal Employee Investigation Outside 
the U.S., 19 INT’L HUM. RESOURCES J. 1, 4 (2010) (“Jurisdictions like Hungary do not 
recognize a viable in-house lawyer privilege.  A broad overview published in Inside 
Counsel lists the ‘EU member states that recognize privilege for the in-house bar’ as 
‘Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, 
UK.’”). 
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As the Akzo Nobel decision makes strikingly clear, one must be 
familiar with privilege laws in the jurisdictions, both regional and na-
tional, involved in an international internal investigation as the rules 
vary dramatically by country and subject matter.44  While the differ-
ent variations of privilege can have a myriad of impacts on an internal 
inquiry, two will be mentioned here specifically.  First, the role of in-
house counsel, including a corporation’s general counsel, must be 
closely examined.  While it is common for in-house counsel in the 
United States to perform a preliminary inquiry to determine whether 
outside counsel is required for a more extensive investigation, in 
some jurisdictions the materials and information collected during this 
initial appraisal of the situation might not be protected from compul-
sory disclosure.45  Further, to the extent in-house counsel seeks to as-
sist outside counsel during the performance of the internal investiga-
tion, consideration must be given to whether such activity would be 
covered by privilege.46  While an argument exists that any such assis-
tance by in-house counsel would be at the direction of a recognized 
outside “attorney,” this argument may be defeated in jurisdictions 
that interpret privilege in a narrow fashion.47  Second, counsel must 
be aware of the possibility that attorneys from one region of the globe 
might not enjoy any privilege protections in certain jurisdictions, even 
if they are independent outside counsel.  As has been noted by some 
commentators, the European Court of Justice’s decision on the issue 
of privilege in Akzo Nobel contains language indicating attorneys un-
licensed within the EU itself may not enjoy privilege when working 
 
 44. See Terry, supra note 29, at 1. 
 45. See supra notes 31–43 and accompanying text; see also Gergacz, supra note 
40, at 328 (“Under the law of the United States, in-house counsel are not disqualified 
from having privileged communications with their client . . . .  Thus, a lawyer’s em-
ployment status as in-house or outside counsel has never affected the applicability of 
the attorney-client privilege in the United States.”).  
 46. See Gergacz, supra note 40, at 328. 
 47. See Fed. R. Evid. 501 (2011).  
The value of the privilege would be substantially diminished if it covered 
only statements between the attorney and the client. Often the attorney 
must retain agents, such as private investigators and psychiatric and forensic 
experts. If communications to these agents resulted in a loss of privilege, 
then the agents could not be effectively used, and the effectiveness of the 
representation (which the privilege serves to strengthen) would suffer. Ac-
cordingly, communications from the client to and through agents hired by 
the attorney in furtherance of the representation can qualify for the attor-
ney-client privilege.  
Id., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Daniel J. Capra & Michael M. Martin cmt. 
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for clients within its borders.48  While grappling with the difficulties 
presented by these divergent privilege rules is challenging, conducting 
an international internal investigation without consideration of their 
impact on the course and conduct of the inquiry could be fatal. 
II.  COLLECTING, REVIEWING AND TRANSFERRING 
INVESTIGATORY DOCUMENTS FROM ABROAD 
The starting place for any internal investigation is the collection of 
relevant documentary evidence for review and analysis.49  Such an 
undertaking allows counsel to begin the process of compartmentaliz-
ing information, piecing together facts, identifying issues for further 
analysis, and preparing for employee interviews.50  In the internation-
al context, however, collection, review, and transfer of documentation 
can present unique challenges to counsel because of the growing 
prevalence of data protection laws around the globe.51  First, some da-
 
 48. See Terry, supra note 29, at 3 (footnote omitted) (“One of the unanswered 
questions after Akzo Nobel is the extent to which the EU competition LPP [privilege 
rules] excludes non-EU lawyers.  On the one hand, both the AM&S decision and the 
Akzo Nobel Advocate General’s opinion include language that arguably limits LPP 
to lawyers located with the EU and the European Economic Area . . . .  On the other 
hand, the Akzo Nobel decision itself refers to the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ indicators 
of ‘independence’ but does not use language that would automatically exclude from 
LPP protection communications with independent, non-employed lawyers from non-
EU/EEA nations.”). 
 49. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 
676 (“The first step in any internal investigation is the gathering of the relevant in-
formation through collection and review of documents.”); Murphy & Dervan, Watch-
ing Your Step, supra note 1, at 6–7 (discussing the importance of document collec-
tion); see also Johnston, supra note 23, at 73 (“Before an investigator begins the all-
important process of interviewing corporate employees and other available witnesses, 
it is advisable that the investigator identify and gather all possible sources of docu-
mentary evidence relating to the conduct in question.”).  
 50. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 
676 (discussing the need for documentation to draw accurate and credible conclu-
sions during an internal investigation); Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, su-
pra note 1, at 6 (“Another important aspect of a credible investigation is ensuring 
that the documents necessary to make accurate findings are present and available for 
review.  Without the relevant materials, it may be difficult or even impossible to 
make well-supported conclusions about the conduct under investigation.”); see also 
Bennett et al., supra note 23, at 68 (“Generally, when conducting an internal investi-
gation, it is preferable to review the relevant documents prior to commencing inter-
views.”). 
 51. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 2 (describing the challenges associated with 
cross-border data transfers and accessing data); see also David Banisar & Simon Da-
vies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of Privacy, Data 
Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 1, 3 (1999) (“In the early 1970s, countries began adopting broad laws in-
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ta protection laws prevent companies from collecting and reviewing 
information, including company emails, that are deemed “personal” 
without consent from the affected employee.52  Further, in securing 
such consent, the corporation may be required to provide the em-
ployee access to the material and an opportunity to correct any inac-
curacies.53 
As an example, the EU has adopted data protection laws that de-
fine “personal data” broadly and require one of several criteria be 
satisfied before collection and processing of such information.54 
 
tended to protect individual privacy.  Throughout the world, there is a general 
movement towards adopting comprehensive privacy laws that set a framework for 
protection.”).   
 52. See George J. Terwilliger III, Transnational Practice in Preventing and Ad-
dressing Corruption Cases, in INT’L WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT 2011 ED., supra 
note 25, at 95, available at 2010 WL 5312204, at *2 (“Procedural differences among 
nations also affect the ability of a company to address suggestions of internal wrong-
doing.  A company conducting an internal investigation in the U.S.— a country that 
does not have the kind of data privacy laws that protect an individual’s e-mail traffic 
and other similar so-called personal data—is less confined, as to the scope and pro-
cess of records review, than it would be in an E.U. country, which does have such da-
ta privacy laws.”); Miriam Wugmeister, Karin Retzer & Cynthia Rich, Global Solu-
tion for Cross-Border Transfers: Making the Case for Corporate Privacy Rules, 38 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 449, 451 (2007) (“More than sixty countries around the world have 
laws that regulate the collection, use and disclosure of personal information.  Typical-
ly these laws cover any personal information pertaining to individual customers, 
business contacts, consumers, employees and in some cases legal entities.”). See gen-
erally James Sullivan, IADC International Law Committee Survey of Electronic Dis-
covery and Data Privacy Law, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 396 (2010) (reviewing data privacy 
laws around the world). 
 53. See Terwilliger, supra note 52, at *2 (“For example, a U.S. investigator . . . 
may be obliged to provide data subjects with access to the data targeted by the inves-
tigation and allow the data subjects to make corrections to any inaccurate data.”); see 
also Dowling, supra note 43, at 2 (“Counterintuitively, data laws can actually require 
turning investigation notes and files over to targets or witnesses.  In EU jurisdictions, 
employee ‘data subjects’ enjoy broad rights to access, and to request deletion or ‘rec-
tification’ of, employer-maintained documents identifying them.”); Wugmeister et al., 
supra note 52, at 451 (“[These laws] also require that individuals whose personal in-
formation is maintained by an organization be given notice of, and in certain circum-
stances the right to consent (or to withhold consent) to, the collection, use and trans-
fer of their personal information, as well as the right to access and correct the 
information held about them.”). 
It should be noted that this right may even extend to internal investigatory notes.  As 
one publication regarding such investigations noted, “Data law in some jurisdictions 
can require notifying targets and implicated witnesses that investigation notes identi-
fy them, and can require offering them limited access to a pending-investigation file.” 
Dowling, supra note 43, at 5. 
 54. See Wugmeister et al., supra note 52, at 456; see also Beryl A. Howell & 
Laura S. Wertheimer, Data Detours in Internal Investigations in EU Countries: Part 
I, 16 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 30 (2008) [hereinafter Howell & Wertheimer, Part I] 
(third alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (“‘[P]ersonal data’ . . . is defined as 
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According to the EU Directive, personal information can only be 
processed when one of the following exceptions is met: consent from 
the individual; contractual necessity (that is, data may be used if 
necessary for the performance of the contract with the individual); 
compliance with (local) legal obligations; or the legitimate interests 
of the entity collecting the personal information outweigh the priva-
cy interests of the individuals.55 
While one might argue that the covert collection and review of em-
ployees’ personal data as part of an internal investigation regarding 
potential criminal wrongdoing is necessary and permissible under the 
final above criteria, it must be noted that “many of the data privacy 
laws in the E.U. are structured so that the degree of protection that is 
afforded to an individual’s data increases as the investigation trends 
more toward criminal rather than the administrative.”56 
Second, some data protection laws prevent or hinder the transfer of 
certain data outside the country of origin, including transfers back to 
corporate headquarters or affiliates located in other countries.57  For 
example, in the EU, the transfer of “personal” information to coun-
tries outside the European Economic Area is prohibited unless an 
“adequate” level of protection is provided by the country to which the 
 
data that ‘relate[s] to an identified person or identifiable natural person’ (i.e., the da-
ta subject), who ‘can be identified, directly or indirectly,’ by reference to an identifi-
cation number or ‘to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity.’”). 
 55. Wugmeister et al., supra note 52, at 456. 
 56. Terwilliger, supra note 52, at *2 (emphasis added). 
 57. See Christopher J. Clark, The Complexities to International White Collar En-
forcement, in INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT: LEADING LAWYERS 
ON UNDERSTANDING CROSS-BORDER REGULATIONS, DEVELOPING CLIENT COMPLI-
ANCE PROGRAMS, AND RESPONDING TO GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS 7, 12 
(Michaela Falls ed., 2010) [hereinafter INT’L WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT], availa-
ble at 2010 WL 271738, at *4 (“[E]specially in Europe the laws relating to the transfer 
of data and information are extraordinarily strict.  In the EU, it is against the law to 
transfer electronic data out of the EU if it relates to a person.  That is defined ex-
traordinarily broadly to mean basically any e-mail someone had on their work com-
puter.  So if your client gets a subpoena from the U.S. SEC seeking all the e-mails re-
lating to someone, and this person worked in France, you will probably have to tell 
the SEC you cannot do that, it is against the law.”); Dowling, supra note 43, at 2 (“In 
cross-border investigations, information identifying employees almost inevitably gets 
transmitted back to headquarters.  Before undertaking a specific investigation, build 
channels allowing the legal ‘export’ of investigation data.  This is a keen issue in ju-
risdictions like Belgium and the Netherlands where laws impede cross-border trans-
missions of workplace accusations specifically.”); see also Wugmeister et al., supra 
note 52, at 449 (“Nevertheless, such [data] transfers are becoming more difficult and 
costly from a business perspective as more countries adopt privacy laws that, among 
other things, regulate and limit cross-border transfers of personal information, in-
cluding transfers to headquarters, affiliates, branch offices or subsidiaries.”). 
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information is being transferred.58  A failure to satisfy the stringent 
EU data protection requirements may result in substantial liability for 
the breaching entity, including criminal liability for investigating 
counsel.59 
One company that likely navigated the challenges presented by the 
growing cadre of data protection laws is Avon Products Inc., which 
since 2008 has been conducting an international internal investigation 
regarding allegations of bribery by its officials in numerous countries, 
including China.60  China has strong data protection laws, including 
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets 
(Chinese State Secrets Law), which was first passed in 1989 and re-
vised in 2010.61  The Chinese State Secrets Law broadly defines state 
 
 58. See Wugmeister et al., supra note 52, at 458 (“The transfer of personal infor-
mation to countries outside the EEA is prohibited unless the receiving countries pro-
vide an “adequate” level of protection, as determined by the European Commission 
or national DPAs, or the transfer satisfies one of the exceptions contained in law . . . .  
To date, the European Commission has deemed adequate the laws of Argentina, 
Canada, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, and Switzerland, as well as the U.S. Safe Harbor 
Framework.”). 
 59. Id.; see Howell & Wertheimer, Part I, supra note 54, at 30 (“The specific laws 
of the country in which data is sought for an internal inquiry must be examined, both 
because the substance of the limitations as well as the penalties for violating the limi-
tations, differ.  For example, violations of the French data protection law carry both 
civil and criminal penalties, while the UK data protection law does not, as yet, pro-
vide criminal penalties.”); Terwilliger, supra note 52, at *2 (“A U.S. investigator can 
be held criminally liable in the E.U. country for failing to comply with these data pro-
cessing and export requirements.”).  
 60. See Avon Products, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Oct. 28, 2010), at 10, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/8868/000119312510238768/d10q. 
htm (“As previously reported, we have engaged outside counsel to conduct an inter-
nal investigation and compliance reviews focused on compliance with the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and related U.S. and foreign laws in China and ad-
ditional countries.  The internal investigation, which is being conducted under the 
oversight of our Audit Committee, began in June 2008.  As we reported in October 
2008, we voluntarily contacted the United States Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and the United States Department of Justice to advise both agencies of our in-
ternal investigation.  We are continuing to cooperate with both agencies and inquiries 
by them, including but not limited to, signing tolling agreements, translating and pro-
ducing documents and assisting with interviews.”); see also Chen Weihua, Multina-
tionals Under Scrutiny for Corruption, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-09/08/content_11273809.htm (“In the past years, there 
have been many high profile bribery cases involving multinationals operating in Chi-
na.  Multinational companies such as Rio Tinto, Siemens, Daimler, Lucent, Avery 
Dennison, IBM, Avon, Diagnostic Products and UTStarcom have all been penal-
ized.”).    
 61. See Sigrid U. Jernudd, Comment, China, State Secrets, and the Case of Xue 
Feng: The Implication for International Trade, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 309, 317 (2011) 
(“The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets was first 
passed in 1989, replacing provisional regulations that were developed in 1951.  The 
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secrets to include “matters that relate to state security and national 
interests,” a statement that leaves much ambiguity and uncertainty 
regarding what types of data may be collected and transferred out of 
the country during an investigation.62  As one set of practitioners has 
noted, “[T]he [international internal] investigative team must ensure 
that the data and information being exported from China does not 
constitute state secrets.  This can be difficult given that the categories 
of state secrets remain vague and open to subjective interpretation.”63  
Further, the penalties for failing to abide by the Chinese State Secrets 
Law are severe, including capital punishments for intentional misap-
propriations and lesser punishments for other disclosures, including 
the strict liability offense of “stealing” state secrets.64 
An incident perpetuating investigating counsels’ above described 
uncertainty and anxiety regarding the applicability of the Chinese 
State Secrets Law is the case of Xue Feng.65  Xue Feng, a naturalized 
American citizen, was a geologist working in China for an American 
company.66  Under instructions from his employer, Xue Feng pur-
 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee then passed a revised version of the 
Law on the Protection of State Secrets on April 29, 2010.”); see also Mitchell S. 
Ettinger & Patrick H. Haggerty, Increased International Coordination and Coopera-
tion to Fight Corruption and the Impact on Multinational Companies, 25TH ANNUAL 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME, at J-8 (Mar. 2–5, 2011) (“When ex-
porting data and information, consideration needs to be given to state secret laws.  
For example, China’s long anticipated amended Law on Guarding State Secrets (the 
Law) came into force on October 1, 2010.”).  
 62. Law on the Protection of State Secrets, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, Art. 
2, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=140200 
(last visited September 16, 2011); see also Jernudd, supra note 61, at 319 (noting the 
ongoing debate regarding the breadth and transparency of the existing Chinese State 
Secrets Law).  
 63. Ettinger & Haggerty, supra note 61, at J-8.  
 64. See Jernudd, supra note 61, at 319–20 (“The penalties for violating the State 
Secrets Law are found in the Chinese Criminal Law, which also defines the particular 
offenses.  The most serious offense is that of ‘stealing, spying to obtain, buying, or 
unlawfully supplying’ state secrets to ‘an organ, organization, or individual outside 
the territories of China,’ which, if done with subjective intent to deal with a state se-
cret, will be punished with anything between five years imprisonment and the death 
penalty, depending on the seriousness of the circumstances of the crime.  Unlawfully 
acquiring state secrets, either through ‘stealing,’ ‘spying,’ or ‘buying,’ which does not 
have a mens rea specified, carries penalties of up to three years, or in more serious 
cases, of three to seven years.  Similar punishments follow for the crime of divulging 
state secrets, which can be done with ‘subjective intent’ or merely fault.”). 
 65. See Jernudd, supra note 61, at 322–23. 
 66. See id.; Ariana E. Cha, In China, the Business of ‘State Secrets’, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/03/ 
AR2010030303852.html (“When Xue bought the surveys and maps for use in his 
company’s research reports, the information was openly available.”); Andrew Jacobs, 
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chased an unprotected database regarding oil and gas information 
and transferred the data out of China to his employer in the United 
States.67  Following the transfer, Chinese authorities determined that 
the data constituted state secrets under the narrow pre-2010 defini-
tion and, in 1997, Xue Feng was taken into custody.68  This despite the 
fact that much of the information he transferred to the United States 
on behalf of his employer remains publically available inside China.69  
Xue Feng was eventually tried and convicted of violating the Chinese 
State Secrets Law and sentenced to eight years in prison for industrial 
espionage, a sentence that has subsequently been affirmed on ap-
peal.70 
The Xue Feng case and above described Chinese and European 
data protection laws convey the significance of carefully contemplat-
ing potential restrictions on and ramifications flowing from the collec-
tion, review, and transfer of data and information during internation-
al internal investigations.71  As it becomes increasingly common for 
 
China Upholds Conviction of American Geologist, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/asia/19beijing.html.  
 67. See Jacobs, supra note 66 (“His lawyer says the information was classified as 
secret only after he bought it.”); Jernudd, supra note 61, at 322 (“[H]e purchased a 
database of oil and gas information that was deemed to be unprotected; however, af-
ter its purchase and conveyance to the US, China determined that the material was a 
state secret.”).  
 68. See Jernudd, supra note 61, at 322.  The pre-2010 Chinese State Secrets Law 
covered “matters that have a vital bearing on state security and national interests.” 
Id. at 318.  The 2010 amendment removed the terms “vital bearing” and, therefore, 
made the provision arguably broader than that used against Xue Feng. Id.    
 69. Id. at 322 (“Much of the information in the databases is publically available 
and necessary for basic due diligence work for businesses involved with the Central 
SOEs.”); see also Daniel M. Anderson, Taking Stock in China: Company Disclosure 
and Information in China’s Stock Markets, 88 GEO. L.J. 1919, 1950–51 (2000) (“Un-
der the law on Guarding State Secrets, state secrets are broadly defined to include 
nonpublic financial and economic information.  In 1994, a reporter for the Ming Pao 
newspaper in Hong Kong was sentenced under this law to ten to twelve years in pris-
on for allegedly disclosing internal interest rate and gold policies of the PBOC.  The 
potential liability for reporting undisclosed material may remove the incentive to in-
vestigate companies; therefore, company disclosures will remain unquestioned.”). 
 70. See Jacobs, supra note 66 (“In a case that has prompted a number of appeals 
from the White House, a Chinese court on Friday upheld the conviction of an Ameri-
can oil geologist sentenced to eight years in prison on charges of industrial espio-
nage.”).   
 71. See Lorenza F. Hofer, New Conditions for Data Processing by Companies: 
First Experiences with the Revised Swiss Data Protection Law, 5 IBA CONVER-
GENCE 113 (2009) (discussing Swiss data protection laws). See generally Thomas 
Rihm, New International Data Transfer Rules for Switzerland: Business Friendly by 
Respecting Employees’ Privacy Rights, 18 EMP. & INDUS. REL. L. 16 (2008) (discuss-
ing Swiss data protection laws).  
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countries around the globe to create restrictive and varying laws pro-
tecting data, internal investigators must recognize that utilization of a 
standard Americanized investigatory strategy can result in significant 
collateral consequences and liabilities for both client and counsel.72  
As such, internal investigators must be cognizant of the difficulties 
data collection and review present in the international setting and be 
proactive in determining the most appropriate procedures in each in-
dividual jurisdictional setting.73 
III.  DEALING WITH EMPLOYEES IN AN INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
There are two particularly defining encounters with employees 
during an internal investigation.  The first is when investigating coun-
sel interviews employees as part of the inquiry.74  When conducting 
such interviews, counsel must be cognizant of her ethical and legal du-
ty to clarify the relationship between herself and the interviewee 
through the delivery of an Upjohn warning.75 
The warning typically includes the following elements: the attorney 
represents the corporation and not the individual employee; the in-
terview is covered by the attorney-client privilege, which belongs to 
and is controlled by the corporation, not the individual employee; 
the corporation may decide, in its sole discretion, whether to waive 
 
 72. See Jorg Rehder & Erika C. Collins, The Legal Transfer of Employment-
Related Data to Outside the EU: Is It Still Even Possible?, 39 INT’L LAW. 129, 129 
(2005) (“Current European Union (EU) data privacy laws place multinational com-
panies in an unenviable position. On one hand, the laws are broadly worded yet 
strict, and on the other, a multitude of questions regarding application and enforce-
ment remain unanswered.”). 
 73. See Beryl A. Howell & Laura S. Wertheimer, Data Detours in Internal Inves-
tigations in EU Countries: Part II, 16 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 38, 39 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Howell & Wertheimer, Part II] (“While far from an impossible task, an under-
standing of the requirements contained in the EU Directive, as well as possible 
exceptions to these requirements, is necessary so that U.S. lawyers conducting an in-
ternal inquiry that involves data in the EU can collect, process and review the data, 
without exposing themselves or their clients to possible liability for violations of the 
EU Directive.”). 
 74. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 
676 (“The second step is to gather information through employee interviews.”).   
 75. See Johnston, supra note 23, at 74–75 (“Before beginning the process of wit-
ness interviews, however, counsel must consider a key ethical concern: counsel con-
ducting an internal investigation represents the company, and not the witness.”).  
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the privilege and disclose information from the interview to third 
parties, including the government.76 
Often, during internal investigations in the United States, little else 
need be done beyond giving the targeted employee this preliminary 
instruction and proceeding with the questioning.77  In foreign jurisdic-
tions, however, investigating counsel must be alert to the possibility 
that local laws may restrict one’s ability to conduct employee inter-
views or, at a minimum, may curtail the manner in which any such in-
terview may occur.78  As one commentator notes, several European 
nations restrict in total the ability of counsel conducting an interna-
tional internal investigation to interview witnesses if there are parallel 
proceedings.79 
[M]any European countries have what are called blocking statutes, 
which prohibit the interview of witnesses.  In a potential civil or 
criminal investigation in that jurisdiction, of which France is a good 
example, you are not allowed to interview a witness who was also a 
witness in a French criminal investigation.  So if you have a multi-
jurisdictional insider trading investigation, you are not allowed to go 
to France and interview that witness without the permission of the 
French authorities.80 
Even where such onerous blocking statutes are not applicable, lo-
cal labor laws and related regulations may impede one’s ability to 
 
 76. Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 677; 
see also Duggin, supra note 18, at 893–99 (discussing the case of Upjohn v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).  
 77. It should be noted that some counsel in the United States also provide an ad-
ditional warning regarding the possibility of the government indicting an individual 
for obstruction of justice should he or she provide false information to internal inves-
tigators who then provide that information to the government. See Lucian E. Dervan, 
Over-Criminalization 2.0: The Role of Plea Bargaining, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 
646–49 (2011) (discussing the Computer Associates prosecution); see also Murphy & 
Dervan, Watching Your Step, supra note 1, at 3; (“Although some attorneys provide 
additional interview warnings to employees, counsel must be mindful of the delicate 
balance between providing sufficient cautions and obtaining information necessary to 
further the company’s investigation.  Excessive warnings can chill an employee’s will-
ingness to cooperate.”). 
 78. See Clark, supra note 57, at *4; D. Michael Crites, Recent Trends in White 
Collar Crime, in INT’L WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT, 2010 WL 5312199, at *2 
(2010); Dowling, supra note 43, at 3; .  
 79. See Clark, supra note 57, at *4; see also Dowling, supra note 43, at 3 (“Some 
jurisdictions actually prohibit non-government employers from conducting quasi-
criminal internal investigations on the theory that private parties cannot intrude on 
the exclusive policing authority of government law enforcers.”).  
 80. Clark, supra note 57, at *4; see also Crites, supra note 78, at *2 (“[M]any coun-
tries have blocking statutes that prohibit counsel from interviewing witnesses without 
permission from the host country.”).  
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quickly conduct employee interviews in an informal one-on-one set-
ting.81  For example, the employee may have the right to consult with 
representatives before being interviewed or to have such representa-
tives present during the interview itself.82 
The second defining encounter with employees during an internal 
investigation occurs when employees are disciplined either because 
they have failed to cooperate with the inquiry or the investigation has 
revealed that they have committed wrongful conduct.83  When disci-
plining employees in the United States under either of these scenari-
os, corporations and their counsel have significant discretion in de-
termining the appropriate procedures and punishments, up to and 
including termination.84  This, however, is not the case in most other 
jurisdictions around the world.85  First, employees in many countries 
are not required to cooperate with internal investigations and, there-
fore, may not be disciplined for such refusals.86  Second, employees in 
foreign jurisdictions are often entitled to damages or severance pay 
when terminated, even for good cause, and must be afforded certain 
procedural rights during the disciplinary process.87  In this context, 
some countries even impose strict temporal limitations on disciplinary 
 
 81. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 5. 
 82. Id. at 5 (“Local labor laws may require consulting with employee representa-
tives before interviewing a slate of employee witnesses, and some jurisdictions re-
quire allowing a representative to accompany an employee witness in an interview, 
analogous to American Weingarten rights.”).  
 83. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 
678. 
 84. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr. & Darin R. Leong, Britain’s New Discipline Pro-
cedure Law: Action Steps for American Compliance, 14 INT’L HUM. RESOURCES J. 1, 
1 (2005) (“Nothing about [Donald] Trump’s brusque procedures [for firing individu-
als on The Apprentice] strikes American ‘couch potatoes’ as odd, because nothing 
about it is illegal or contrary to U.S. practice.  American-style employment-at-will 
lets Trump fire anyone for any reason (except an illegal reason), and our employ-
ment-at-will rule also leaves Trump free to use whatever discharge procedure he 
wants.”).   
 85. See Dowling & Leong, supra note 84, at 1 (“The rest of the world . . . is a lot 
different.  ‘Employment-at-will’ exists almost nowhere else.”).   
 86. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 5. (“[O]utside of U.S. employment-at-will, 
forcing employees to ‘cooperate’ raises employment law challenges.  Overseas em-
ployees may in effect invoke a legal right to remain silent analogous to the right 
against self-incrimination in a U.S. criminal investigation.”); see also Greg Farrell, 
IMF Dropped Internal Probe of Strauss-Kahn After Woman Wouldn’t Cooperate, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (May 21, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-20/ 
strauss-kahn-imf-probe-aborted-in-2008-as-alleged-victim-wouldn-t-testify.html (dis-
cussing the refusal of an IMF employee to cooperate in a 2008 internal investigation 
regarding Dominique Strauss-Kahn). 
 87. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 5.  
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actions, which can create significant difficulties for internal investiga-
tors examining complex matters.88 
In Belgium, for example, an employee termination for good cause 
“must occur within three working days from the moment the facts 
are known to the [employer]; the facts must be notified to the dis-
missed [employee] by registered mail within three working days 
from the date of dismissal.”  The clock here can start as soon as an 
employer gets a credible allegation, not after it completes a full-
blown internal investigation.89 
While such restrictions on disciplinary procedures and determina-
tions seem unnaturally intrusive in the American corporate context, 
counsel must be aware of the impact of these laws on the course of an 
international internal investigation. 
The breadth of laws in foreign jurisdictions regarding disciplinary 
procedures is exemplified by a series of communications recently re-
leased as part of the current investigations of phone-hacking by the 
now defunct News of the World.90  While much attention is currently 
centered on hacking from recent years, this is not the first time the 
newspaper had dealt with this issue.91  In 2007, Clive Goodman, a 
former News of the World reporter in Britain pleaded guilty to 
phone-hacking charges and was imprisoned.92  Shortly after his guilty 
plea, he received a letter from company officials: 
I am sorry to have to be writing this letter, but am afraid that events 
of the last few days and months provide us no choice but to termi-
nate your employment with News Group Newspapers Limited. This 
action, I know you understand, is the consequence of your plea of 
guilty, and subsequent imprisonment on 26 January, in relation to 
conspiracy to intercept voicemail messages.  This obviously consti-
tutes a very serious breach of your obligations as an employee, such 
as to warrant dismissal without any warning.  In the circumstances of 
your plea and the court’s sentence, it is reasonable for us to dismiss 
you without any further enquiries.93 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 3 (quoting Carl Bevernage, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAWS 3-38 (William L. Keller et al. eds., 2009)). 
 90. See Paul Sonne, Jeanne Whalen & Bruce Orwall, New Issues Emerge for 
News Corp. in Britain, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 
10001424053111903480904576511963847040354.html.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (follow “Documents Relating to Clive Goodman” hyperlink; then view 
page 8/36). 
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In response, Goodman sent a letter to the company containing nu-
merous allegations, including the following statement: “The dismissal 
is automatically unfair as the company failed to go through the mini-
mum required statutory dismissal procedures.”94 
The newspaper responded to Goodman’s allegations as follows: 
I would like to request your attendance at an appeal hearing on 
Tuesday, 20th March 2007 at 10:00 am at the offices of News Maga-
zine Limited . . . .  The purpose of the hearing is to consider, under 
the News International disciplinary procedure, your appeal against 
your dismissal on 5th February, on the grounds raised in your letter 
of 2nd March. . . .  You are entitled to be accompanied as specified in 
the Company’s Disciplinary procedures.  Please let me know in ad-
vance if you decide to bring a companion and their name and con-
tact details.  If there are any documents you wish to be considered at 
the appeal hearing, please provide copies as soon as possible.  If you 
do not have those documents, please provide details so that they can 
be obtained.95 
While such an exchange and appeals process might appear absurd 
in the United States, particularly given the serious criminal conviction 
of the employee and the criminal offense’s direct relation to his work 
at the corporation, British law imposes strikingly different obligations 
on employers. 
Since 2004, the United Kingdom has imposed an extensive “Code 
of Practice for Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures” on employers 
that dictates the manner in which all manner of significant discipline 
may be imposed, including terminations.96  At its most basic, the law 
requires a three-step process of notice and meeting prior to any disci-
plinary action, a disciplinary hearing at which the employee may re-
spond to the allegations, and an appeals process to challenge the cor-
poration’s disciplinary decision.97  Failure to abide by these 
requirements can result in serious penalties for the corporation.98 
 
 94. Id. (follow “Goodman’s March 2007 Letter Protesting His Dismissal” hyper-
link; then view page 2/2). 
 95. Id. (follow “Documents Relating to Clive Goodman” hyperlink; then view 
page 12/36). 
 96. See Dowling & Leong, supra note 84, at 1 (“The upshot of these [UK discipli-
nary and grievance laws] is that as of October 1, 2004, in Britain a Donald-Trump-
style ‘You’re sacked!’ is flatly illegal.”).  
 97. Id. at 3.  In France, the following must be done to satisfy employment laws:  
“Set meeting with employee or ‘works council,’ via certified mail letter; conduct dis-
missal meeting; inform about reasons for termination and relocation opportunities; 
serve formal dismissal notice by certified mail; inform government labor agency.” Id. 
at 2. See generally Thomas Eger, Opportunistic Termination of Employment Con-
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As with the other unique aspects and challenges of conducting in-
ternational internal investigations, counsel must be aware of the sig-
nificant differences that exist between jurisdictions regarding discipli-
nary procedures and options.  Even in situations where the conduct of 
the employee under review clearly violates corporate standards and 
rules of conduct, local labor laws may dictate the manner in which 
disciplinary action may be taken.99  Proceeding without an under-
standing of the constraints and deadlines imposed by such require-
ments may lead to additional exposure for clients and limiting of op-
tions in response to troubling conduct by employees.100 
IV.  DISCLOSURE AND SETTLEMENT AFTER INTERNATIONAL 
INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 
One of the most challenging decisions faced by corporations at the 
conclusion of an internal investigation where the government is, as of 
yet, unaware of the conduct under examination is determining wheth-
er to disclose the investigatory findings.101  While some disclosures are 
required by law, there can also be several advantages to disclosure 
even where it is permissive, including receipt of cooperation credit 
from the DOJ when determining the appropriate governmental re-
sponse and potential application of amnesty programs.102  As an ex-
 
tracts and Legal Protection Against Dismissal in Germany and the USA, 23 INT’L 
REV. L & ECON. 381 (2004) (discussing labor law requirements in Germany); Otto 
Kaufman, Weakening of Dismissal Protection or Strengthening of Employment Poli-
cy in France?, 36 INDUS. L.J. 267 (2007) (discussing labor law requirements in 
France).  
 98. Dowling & Leong, supra note 84, at 2 (“The imposition of these new proce-
dures is no mere technicality, as penalties are severe.”).  
 99. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 6 (“In France, UK, and elsewhere, even for-
cause terminations of the obviously-guilty must follow detailed procedures.”).   
 100. It is even possible that a corporation might find itself in the unenviable posi-
tion of selecting between abiding by local labor laws or acquiescing to a governmen-
tal request that culpable employees be punished. See id.  
 101. See Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, supra note 1, at 9 (“Although 
counsel conducting an internal investigation should take steps to safeguard the com-
pany’s attorney-client privilege, she always should keep in mind that, at some point, it 
may be necessary or even advantageous for the company to disclose the results of the 
investigation and, perhaps, even materials generated during the inquiry.”); see also 
Bennett et al., supra note 23, at 80 (“Where a company conducts an internal investi-
gation based upon information it receives about possible wrongdoing that is not 
known to the government, the question arises whether the findings of the investiga-
tion should be disclosed to the government.”).   
 102. See Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, supra note 1, at 9–10 (“When 
dealing with the government, the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing will often work to its advantage.  In determining whether to charge a 
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ample, in 2008 the U.S. government alleged that Siemens had en-
gaged in widespread bribery overseas.103  In response, the company 
hired an outside law firm to conduct a thorough internal investiga-
tion.104  The inquiry covered thirty-four countries, included over 1750 
interviews, and resulted in the collection of more than one-hundred 
million documents.105  Throughout this extensive investigation, Sie-
mens cooperated fully with the government and provided documents 
and other information as requested.106  As a result, Siemens was re-
warded with significantly less punishment than might otherwise have 
been exacted on the corporation for its conduct: 
Though Siemens could have been fined as much as $2.7 billion in the 
criminal prosecution, the Justice Department and SEC settled for a 
combined U.S. total of $800 million. The Justice Department has not 
prosecuted any of the company’s executives or employees for the vi-
olations. Based partly on Siemens’ cooperation in the case, the U.S. 
government decided that the firm could remain eligible for federal 
contracts, a priority for Siemens.107 
 
corporation, the Department of Justice advises prosecutors to weigh the ‘timely and 
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with the govern-
ment’s investigation.’” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (Jan. 20, 2003))).  “Even if disclosure to 
the government does not forestall criminal charges, it can significantly reduce the 
corporation’s exposure to criminal penalties.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines also 
contain language equating cooperation with a disclosure of ‘pertinent information,’ 
including, if necessary, privileged material.” Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2004)); see also Bennett et al., supra note 23, at 80 
(“[V]arious federal agencies and other regulatory bodies have developed more or less 
formal programs for crediting voluntary disclosures in the exercise of their regulatory 
authority.”).  Although the Federal Principles of Prosecution and U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines have been amended over time, these basic edicts remain a centerpiece of 
the documents.  
 103. See Hilzenrath, supra note 13, at 2 (“The allegations were based largely on an 
internal investigation that Siemens, an engineering company based in Germany, be-
gan in 2006 after German authorities raided company offices and employees’ 
homes.”).  
 104. See id. 
 105. See id.  
 106. See id. at 3 (“Siemens routinely provided English translations of its docu-
ments, the Justice Department said in a court filing, ‘thereby saving the Department 
very significant time and expense.’”).  
 107. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Sub-
sidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay 
$450 Million in Combined Fines (Dec. 15, 2008) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.  
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For Siemens, disclosure and cooperation proved to be valuable 
tools in resolving its case in a satisfactory manner with both American 
and European authorities.108 
As was true in the Siemens case, many internal corporate investiga-
tions today involve examination of international conduct.  Therefore, 
potential resolution of the matter requires consideration of not only 
American disclosure obligations and advantages, but such obligations 
and advantages on a global scale.109  In this regard, it is important to 
note first that the United States is not the only country that rewards 
disclosure and cooperation.110  A significant example is the EU’s am-
nesty program in anti-trust cases.111  Under the European program, 
 
 108. See Hilzenrath, supra note 13, at 2–3; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized 
Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the Siemens 
case); Eric Lichtblau & Carter Dougherty, Siemens to Pay $1.34 Billion in Fines, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business/world 
business/16siemens.html (“Siemens, the German engineering giant, agreed Monday 
to pay a record total of $1.6 billion to American and European authorities to settle 
charges that it routinely used bribes and slush funds to secure huge public works con-
tracts around the world.”).  
 109. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 107 (“The Department and the SEC close-
ly collaborated with the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office in bringing these cases. 
The high level of cooperation, including sharing information and evidence, was made 
possible by the use of mutual legal assistance provisions of the 1997 Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which entered into force 
on Feb. 15, 1999.”). 
While disclosure obligations will not be examined in this Article, it should be noted 
that many jurisdictions have broad requirements that will impact the disclosure deci-
sion. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 6 (“[L]ocal law in some jurisdictions requires de-
nunciation:  In Slovakia, for example, parties with knowledge of a criminal act must 
notify authorities.”).  
 110. See Roberto Grasso, Note, The E.U. Leniency Programs and U.S. Civil Dis-
covery Rules: A Fraternal Fight, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 565, 573 (2008). 
 111. See id.  The United States also has such a program. See Robert W. Tarun & 
Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 174–75 (2010) 
(“The DOJ has established and promoted leniency policies to incentivize corpora-
tions and individuals to report antitrust violations to and cooperate with law en-
forcement.  The Antitrust Division first implemented a leniency program in 1978.  In 
1993, the Division significantly revised and greatly improved the leniency program 
with the issuance of the Corporate Leniency Program.  Under the Division’s Corpo-
rate Leniency Program, ‘a corporation can avoid criminal conviction and fines . . . by 
being the first to confess participation in a criminal antitrust violation, fully cooperat-
ing with the Antitrust Division and meeting other specified conditions.’”). 
In fact, the success of the U.S. amnesty program led to the establishment of similar 
programs by over fifty other nations. See id. at 183. 
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the first corporation to reveal its involvement in anti-competitive 
practices receives immunity.112 
[The Commission] will grant immunity from any fine which would 
otherwise have been imposed to an undertaking disclosing its partic-
ipation in an alleged cartel affecting the Community if that under-
taking is the first to submit information and evidence which in the 
Commission’s view will enable it to: 
(a) carry out a targeted inspection in connection with the alleged 
cartel; or 
(b) find an infringement of Article 81 EC in connection with the al-
leged cartel.113 
Importantly, under the EU anti-trust amnesty program, corpora-
tions that are not the first through the door can still achieve signifi-
cant advantages from self-reporting the discovered conduct.114 
Companies which do not qualify for immunity may benefit from a 
reduction of fines if they provide evidence that represents “signifi-
cant added value” to that already in the Commission’s possession 
and have terminated their participation in the cartel.  Evidence is 
considered to be of a “significant added value” for the Commission 
when it reinforces its ability to prove the infringement.  The first 
company to meet these conditions is granted 30 to 50% reduction, 
the second 20 to 30% and subsequent companies up to 20%.115 
Without carefully examining the unique aspects of disclosure obli-
gations and advantages in the various jurisdictions affected, counsel 
may inadvertently create additional liability for a corporation or for-
feit a potentially significant advantage. 
It is also important to note that while numerous countries offer ad-
vantages to those who disclose investigatory findings and cooperate 
with governmental inquiries, the globalization of white collar crime 
and the international nature of modern internal investigations also 
present significant challenges to successful resolution and settlement 
of such matters.  Two particular reasons for this challenge will be not-
ed herein.  First, different jurisdictions and varying enforcement 
agencies may be unwilling to operate in a uniform timeframe or ap-
 
 112. See Grasso, supra note 110, at 573.  
 113. Id. 
 114. See Cartels: Leniency, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, available at http://ec.europa. 
eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html (last updated Nov. 23, 2011).  
 115. Id. 
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proach the issue of resolution in a similar manner.116  As such, while 
the DOJ may be pressuring a corporation to settle a matter quickly, a 
parallel proceeding in the EU might only just be starting.  Where such 
multijurisdictional inquires are operating at different speeds or one or 
more entities are unwilling to enter into negotiations, it becomes dif-
ficult to settle any of the matters for fear that admissions made during 
one agreement will simply become incriminating admissions for an-
other.117  Second, even where all of the governmental entities in-
volved may be willing and prepared to enter into negotiations, signifi-
cant differences regarding what modes of settlement are appropriate 
may exist.  For example, while non-prosecution and deferred prosecu-
tion agreements are extremely popular mechanisms by which to settle 
matters involving potential corporate criminal liability, they are re-
jected forms of resolution in many jurisdictions outside the United 
States.118 
For any corporation embroiled in a significant global white collar 
criminal matter, a keen awareness of the challenges regarding disclo-
sure and settlement alternatives on an international scale is invalua-
 
 116. See Luke Balleny, Anti-Corruption Views—IBA Conference: The Problems 
with Multijurisdictional Corruption Investigations, TRUSTLAW (June 24, 2011, 10:58 
PM), http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/blogs/anti-corruption-views/iba-conference-the-
problems-with-multijurisdictional-corruption-investigations.  
 117. See id. (“If one set of prosecuting authorities is willing to negotiate and the 
other isn’t, it makes it next to impossible for the defendant to admit to anything of 
substance to the prosecutor that’s open to a settlement.  For if the defendant does 
admit to something, they would simply be giving ammunition for the other prosecu-
tor’s case.”). 
 118. See Nicolas Bourtin, Conflicts of Laws in International White Collar Investi-
gations, in INT’L WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT, supra note 57, available at 2010 WL 
271743, at *6 (2010) (“Outside the United States, the use of such agreements is virtu-
ally unheard of.  Instead, the expectation is that criminal investigations will end in 
one of two ways: with a declination to prosecute or with the filing of charges.”). 
In its simplest form, an NPA [non-prosecution agreement] is an agreement 
by which the government declines to prosecute a defendant in exchange for 
the defendant’s promise for an agreed period of time to cooperate with the 
government’s investigation, abide by the law, and satisfy any number of 
other conditions, which could include the acknowledgement of wrongful 
conduct, the payment of a monetary penalty, or the implementation of re-
medial measures.  Should the defendant fail to uphold its end of the agree-
ment, the government is released from its declination and can file criminal 
charges.  A DPA [deferred prosecution agreement] incorporates many of 
the provisions of an NPA . . . .  In contrast to an NPA, however, a DPA con-
templates the filing of formal criminal charges, which are stayed for an 
agreed period of time in exchange for the defendant’s obligations under the 
agreement.   
Id.  
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ble.  In 2010, BAE Systems settled a long-standing criminal bribery 
investigation that had spanned several continents.119  The settlement 
included guilty pleas by the corporation in both the United States and 
the United Kingdom.120  Though the case involved complex interna-
tional issues, BAE was successful in resolving the matter in a univer-
sally agreeable manner by utilizing the institutions and mechanisms 
available in each of the affected jurisdictions.121  According to the 
United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office (UK SFO), the agreement be-
tween the DOJ, the UK SFO, and BAE was a “ground breaking 
global agreement.”122  As the globalization of white collar crime con-
tinues to bring internal investigations into various international juris-
dictions, the necessity of striving for such truly global settlement will 
only continue to become of greater importance. 
CONCLUSION 
Though this Article only begins to touch on the various types of 
challenges one might experience as a result of the globalization of in-
ternal investigations, it does reveal one constant in such matters.  
Counsel must avoid the temptation of utilizing a standard American-
style investigatory technique when undertaking multi-jurisdictional 
investigations.  As the above examples demonstrate, different juris-
dictions and regions of the world view the tools and techniques of 
such inquiries in strikingly different ways.  Through realization of the 
types of challenges that exist in this field and a willingness to conduct 
particularized investigations that are flexible to the demands of differ-
ing jurisdictions, the achievement of successful and thorough internal 
investigations can continue even in the testing context of growing 
globalization. 
 
 119. See Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark, BAE Settles Corruption Charges, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/business/global/06 
bribe.html.  
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Press Release, U.K. Serious Fraud Office, BAE Systems plc (Feb. 5, 2010), 
available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-
2010/bae-systems-plc.aspx (“I am very pleased with the global outcome achieved col-
laboratively with the DOJ.  This is a first and it brings a pragmatic end to a long-
running and wide-ranging investigation.”).  
